IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY, CO., et al.,)	
Plaintiffs,)	No. 05 C 4095
)	(Consolidated for Pretrial Purposes with No. 07 C 1367)
v.)	,
JOHN BRIDGE, et al.,)	Judge Matthew F. Kennelly
Defendants.)	

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT PAGES TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN BG DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POST-TRIAL MOTION (DKT. 911)

Attached hereto for the Court's convenience are copies of trial transcript pages to which reference is made in the BG Defendants' Post-Trial Motion filed on December 13, 2011 as Dkt. 911.

Respectfully submitted, **BG DEFENDANTS**

By:	/s/ Arthur W. Friedman
	One of their Attorneys

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Dated: December 30, 2011

Fax: 312-263-3270

	II
1 2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
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4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY)
5	COMPANY, et al., Docket No. 05 C 4095
6	Plaintiffs,
7	vs. Chicago, Illinois JOHN BRIDGE, et al., October 12, 2011
8) 2:00 p.m.
9	Defendants.)
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,
11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367
12	vs.
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al., Chicago, Illinois
14	Defendants.
15	VOLUME 2 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
16	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY
17	APPEARANCES:
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19	For the Plaintiff: REED SMITH, LLP BY: MR. JOHN W. MOYNIHAN
20	MR. JONATHAN S. QUINN MR. MAX A. STEIN
21	MR. THOMAS M. LEVINSON
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13	Also Present: MR. MARK MARTIN
14	MR. ANDREW MARKS
15	MR. STANFORD MARKS MS. JOCELYN CONGUA-BLAIR-STOLLER
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23	LAUDA M. DDCNNAN Official Count Description
24	LAURA M. BRENNAN - Official Court Reporter 219 South Dearborn Street - Room 2102 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 435-5785
25	(312) 435-5785

1 in that form?

participation in the sale.

- A. What was called for was an attestation, a swearing, that
 we were not -- Phoenix was not involved with any kind of
 prior arrangement whatsoever with someone else at the tax
 sale who would help Phoenix, would benefit Phoenix from
 - Q. And, sir, were there also representations and warranties included in the registration package?
- 9 A. Yes.

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- Q. And the first representation and warranty said what?
- A. Well, it says that -- we are talking about Phoenix
 now -- that Phoenix has no capital, purchase money, or other
 finances in common with any other bidding entity or person
 registering to bid at the sale.
 - Q. And was that true in the years 2002 to 2007?
 - A. It was true in every year, before then and since.
- 17 Q. And what about B?
 - A. B states that there would be no common ownership interest or common source of funds with any other bidding entity.

That was true when we signed that initially, whichever one we signed, and every one since.

- Q. And what about the next representation? Was that true?
- A. It was true. It provides that we would have no agreements to purchase or sell any properties in connection

- 1 lien sales that you sued about, that Phoenix Bond sued about
- 2 between 2002 and 2007, was there any rule that prohibited the
- 3 post-sale assignment of liens?
- 4 A. No, there was not.
- 5 Q. So, if Phoenix Bond attended a sale and bought liens and
- 6 after the sale it decided it didn't want to keep the
- 7 certificates, Phoenix Bond, during 2002 to 2007, could have
- 8 sold those certificates to anybody, isn't that right?
- 9 A. They could, yes.
- 10 | Q. And that sale would not have violated the single
- 11 | simultaneous bidder rule, is that right?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Is there any rule or law that you know of prohibit --
- 14 against -- let me rephrase that.
- Between 2002 and 2007, relating to the tax lien sales
- 16 at issue in this case, is there any rule that prohibits
- 17 providing bid books to prospective buyers?
- 18 A. Not that I know of, no.
- 19 Q. And between 2002 and 2007 at the tax lien sales at issue
- 20 in this case, was there any law, to the best of your
- 21 knowledge, against providing bid books to prospective buyers?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q Was there any law against people charging prospective
- 24 buyers for bid books during the period of time 2002 to 2007?
- 25 A. No.

1 | A. If I'm --

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Q. I need you to answer that question. I need you to answer this question. I'll state it again.

Between 2002 and 2007, was there any rule that prohibited people from charging prospective bidders for bid books?

- 7 A. Yes, there was.
- 8 Q. What rule was that?
- A. The rule was that you couldn't provide them if you were engaging in participation in the results and consequences of delivery of that book, so that in effect, you had some relationship to the development there, and you were doing the same function for anyone else.
 - Q. What about if you -- if you just charged for a bid book and you didn't have all of those things you just said?
 - A. There's no objection to that, I would think.
- 17 | Q. No rule against it?

Now, is there any rule that prohibited Phoenix Bond as, a registrant for a Cook County tax sale, to give -- to give somebody else a copy of its due diligence of all the information that you acquired before the sale?

- 22 A. Just giving that to someone?
- 23 Q. Right.
- 24 A. Not that I know of.
- 25 Q. All right. Now, you testified before that you were a

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2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION	
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4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY)	
5	COMPANY, et al.,	Docket No. 05 C 4095
6	Plaintiffs,	
7	vs.	Chicago, Illinois
8	JOHN BRIDGE, et al.,	October 13, 2011 9:45 a.m.
9	Defendants.)	
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,	
11	Plaintiffs,	Docket No. 07 C 1367
12	vs.	
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al.,	Chicago, Illinois
14	Defendants.	G ,
15	VOLUM	E 3
16	TRANSCRIPT OF BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHE	
17	400000	
18	APPEARANCES:	
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Stanford Marks - cross

- such as yourself, true?
 A Yes.
 He charged you a fee
 - Q He charged you a fee for that information, didn't he?
- 4 A He did.
- 5 Q He sold it to other tax buyers, didn't he?
- 6 A Yes.

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- 7 | Q They used it at the same sale that you used it at, true?
- 8 A I believe so, yes.
 - Q The fact that two bidders used that same information from the same source certainly did not violate any of the treasurer's rules. Would you agree?
- 12 | A I would agree.
 - Q And whether that information was purchased or just given to the bidder doesn't affect the fact that it doesn't violate the rule, true?
 - A I would agree with that.
 - You described lines of credit that Phoenix Bond had
 arranged in advance of the sales with some of the large banks
 here in Chicago, true?
 - A Yes.
 - Q MB Bank and what was the other?
- 22 A US Bank.
- 23 | Q US Bank.
 - At the time that you registered for the sale, that your company registered for the sale, you certified that you

1 were interested in buying, but that if you got one of them. 2 you might sit out the next eight or nine, is that true? 3 Α. That's true. 4 Q. There were other times when you might have some kind of interest in a property but not a compelling interest, and so 5 you might bid lackadaisically, I think is the word? Is that 6 7 correct? 8 Α. That's correct. And by lackadaisically, it may be that you didn't hurry 9 Q. to get your hand up and you didn't shout out your percentage 10 because you weren't really that interested in the property; 11 12 it wasn't that important to you, correct? 13 Α. I think that's true. 14 Now, it's the position of Phoenix Bond that the Single 15 Simultaneous Bidder Rule prohibits multiple bidders from 16 participating in tax sales contemporaneously for the same 17 registrant, correct? 18 I believe that's a portion of the rule you read, yeah. Α. 19 Q. Well, do you remember -- your deposition was taken I 20 know in three sessions. The one I'm referring to is 21 September 16th of 2009 at page 628. 22 When I asked you the following question -- this is 23 the question: Now, first I assume that it's your position --

MR. JONATHAN QUINN: Objection, your Honor.

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is not impeaching.

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THE COURT: It doesn't need to be. He's a representative of a party. Go ahead. MR. JONATHAN QUINN: My mistake. I'm sorry. BY THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what page did you say? Α. THE COURT: 628. THE WITNESS: I don't have a page 628. THE COURT: He's just going to read it to you for now. Do you want him to have it or do you just want to read it to him? MR. FRIEDMAN: If he wants it, I'm glad to provide it to him. THE COURT: He must have a different volume. (Document tendered.) THE WITNESS: Okay. BY MR. FRIEDMAN: Q. The question I asked, beginning at line 12, is: first I assume that it's your position that the rule enacted in 2001 prohibits multiple bidders from participating in tax sales contemporaneously with the same registrant? And your answer was: Yes. Correct? Α. Yes.

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	5	COMPANY, et al., Docket No. 05 C 4095	
	6	Plaintiffs,	
	7	Vs.) Chicago, Illinois	
	8	JOHN BRIDGE, et al., October 14, 2011 9:00 a.m.	
	9	Defendants.)	
	10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,	
	11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367	
	12	vs.	
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	16	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY	
	17	APPEARANCES:	
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David Gray - deposition

- 1 Q I'm sorry.
 - A Sorry.

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Q This is one of the questions I have been meaning to ask you.

When BG had been buying taxes or bought taxes at the 2002, 3 and 4 sale -- or I should say strike that.

They bought taxes in calendar year 2002?

- A No, 3, 4 and 5.
- Q Sorry. Bought taxes in calendar years 2003, 4 and 5?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q Then Atlantic Municipal bought taxes in calendar years
- 12 | 2006, 7 and 8?
 - A That's correct.
 - Q Okay. Why didn't BG buy taxes in 2006?
- 15 A Because BG's belly was full. It had purchased taxes in
- 16 | the three years prior to that, and it was digesting. By that
- 17 | I mean perfecting title to and attempting to sell and dispose
- of properties that it had acquired, and, therefore, it was
- 19 time to stop for the time being anyway.
- 20 Q Okay. And why didn't Atlantic Municipal conversely buy
- 21 | taxes in the years that BG bought taxes?
- A Well, that probably would have violated the single
- 23 simultaneous bidder rule.
- 24 | Q How?

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A Actually I changed my mind. I guess it probably wouldn't

David Gray - deposition

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It probably wouldn't have. So it simply was a matter have. of policy decision on my part to continue with BG for those three years and then Atlantic for the next three years. were on the same line of credit.

So, no, no. Go back to what I said in the first I think it would have violated the single simultaneous place. bidder rule in that if not the rule, certainly the representations and warranties which were in effect at the time said that there wasn't any common finances and there would have been common finances. So I think it may have violated the rule.

Whether it did or whether it didn't, it was a matter of policy on my part that three years of BG purchases was that -- was quite sufficient and time for somebody else to buy. It was just a part of my all-over plan, the company's all-over plan, family's all-over plan, to put Atlantic in for three years.

- Q Okay. What do you mean by the family's overall plan? Well, the family overall plan basically is, it started in 1990, just going back to what I had said before.
- Q Uh-huh.
- I was about 57, and that's old, and I owned all the stock of Midwest. And when you get old and own all the stock in one company, that's not good.

Therefore, for family purposes, for state tax

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Α Yes.

Was 2001 the first time that you had become independent? Q Α No. I was always independent. I think that it refers possibly to the bank line being independent. I always look at myself as being independent.

I always made my own choices for my company and hired my own employees, had my own health insurance plan, my own 401(k) plan, independent.

We're talking now, I think, about tax matters to which I hire an accountant and pay him a fair sum of money to prepare, but I'm not an accountant, and my background is not in accounting.

- Now, at that time in 2001, you had your own line of credit Q at LaSalle Bank for use in the tax sale, is that correct?
- Α That's correct.
- Q All right. And at any of the subsequent tax sales that you were on, did you use any funds other than funds that you had -- that Wheeler-Dealer had borrowed on this line of credit?
- Α To purchase at the tax sale?
- To purchase at the tax sale. Q
- Α No, I did not.
- Q Now, I want to go back. You were asked a lot of questions about the procedures at the tax sale?
- Q And let's start, first of all, with the presale

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Q And did --

Were the bidders for Wheeler-Dealer and Atlantic visible on that video?

- A Yes, they were, both of them.
- Q They were both in the front rows?
- A That's correct.
- Q Were you the bidder?
 - A No. My employee, Lance Shields, was the bidder.
 - Q So in watching that video, were you able to see whether or not Wheeler-Dealer and Atlantic were bidding on the same bids?
 - A I was able to make a count of that, yes. I was able to make that determination.
 - Q You counted the times that they have been on the same lien?
 - A Yes.
- Q And the times they didn't?
- '∥A That's right. I went through each one.

There were 209 examples where either Wheeler-Dealer or Atlantic Municipal placed a bid on one of the items. And of those 209, there were 58 times, 58 times, where we did not bid on the same item.

And even though I said I'm not very good at math, that is 28 percent difference, 72 percent the other way, where we did not bid on the same item 28 percent of the time, or we did bid on the same item 72 percent of the time, which

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absolutely shows we did not bid on the same items. That's a very large portion.

And was that true in the sales where you were the bidder that you weren't bidding on exactly the same items as BG or Atlantic?

Α Yes, absolutely.

But, in fact, our entire strategies for bidding were different.

Now, you've heard testimony and arguments of lawyers about the business models of various companies that participated in the tax sale?

Yes. Α

What would you say the business model of Wheeler-Dealer Q was?

Well, I think I kind of touched on it, but the reality was we were trying to buy tax liens that had low dollar amounts so I could get my inventory numbers higher.

Again, I wasn't interested in big items. really interested in commercial or industrial, though I did buy a few. But for the most part I was -- at the beginning especially, I bought a lot of vacant lots, hundreds and hundreds of vacant lots on the West Side of Chicago, and a lot them from 12 to 18 percent because everybody thought I was nuts for bidding on them, but I bid on hundreds and hundreds of them, and I was the only one bidding on them most of the

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- That's correct.
- Q That was --
- Yes, I owned zero percent of BG, so no common ownership interest. Common source of funds, I had my own line set up with LaSalle Bank completely separate, hundred percent separate. So I feel like I'm good on B.
- And did you feel when you signed that that the fact that you had borrowed some money from Atlantic --

Well, if BG was the other bidder, which would have been the case in 2004, did you feel that having a loan from Atlantic Municipal constituted a common source of funds for BG?

- No, of course not, absolutely not.
- And later when Atlantic Municipal was the bidder, did you feel that the fact that you had loans from your dad or from profit sharing plan meant that you had a common source of funds?
- No, absolutely not. That's the nature of the loans.
- Now, you testified that in 2004 you sold your stock in Q Atlantic, is that correct?
- Α Yes.

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And that was prior to the year that -- it was two years Q prior to the year that Atlantic first bid at this sale, is that correct?

		Timothy Gray - cross
	1	A That's correct, Tom. It was a little over two years, as I
y	2	remember.
	3	Q At the time they bid in 2006 and 2007, you had no
	4	ownership interest in Atlantic?
	5	A Two years removed from that.
	6	Q Now, you were asked whether there had been and your dad
	7	in his deposition was asked whether there was a stock
	8	purchase agreement, is that correct?
	9	A Yes, that's right.
	10	Q And I believe you replied that there was a canceled stock
	11	certificate, is that correct?
	12	A Yes.
	13	Q I want to show you what is part of Defendants'
	14	Exhibit 165. Is that the canceled certificate?
	15	A It is.
	16	Q Showing a sale of your shares?
	17	A It was canceled 7/1/04, and you can see the name Timothy
	18	E. Gray is written, and that is the document, yes, sir.
	19	THE COURT: What was that number, Mr. Huyck? I'm
	20	sorry.
	21	MR. HUYCK: 165, Defendants' 165.
	22	(Brief interruption.)
	23	BY MR. HUYCK:
	24	Q Now, you've testified, and your dad testified at his
	25	deposition, that it was Mr. Palasz who decided the amount of

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oftentimes every month like clock work, so that I paid for my portion of everything. There was nothing handed to me here.

There was another thing I wanted to ask you about, the registration form, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 400.

You were also asked about this document, the acknowledgment of single simultaneous bidder rule.

Α Yes, Tom.

When you signed that form in 2004, did you think that because of BG bidding at that sale that you and BG were in violation of that rule?

Α No, absolutely not.

What was your understanding of the rule?

My understanding of the rule is that if you had another bidder bidding on your behalf in that room with the same money that you are contributing to, your money, that would be a violation of the rule.

So, therefore, I own a hundred percent of my company. I have a hundred percent control in the line of credit which I went out and got from the bank, and I'm using that. No one owns my company. No one controls my finances. I have my own employees. And there is absolutely no question that there was anyone else bidding in that room for me.

And I would love to see a penny from anyone in that room bidding for me. There was no one. It was just me or Lance, which is my employee.

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Q Now, there is a footnote on this form defining the term "related bidding entity."

A Yes.

Q Do you see that?
(Brief interruption.)

BY MR. HUYCK:

Q At any rate it says --

THE COURT: I think he can see it, and I think the jurors can all see it. I don't think you have to worry about it.

BY MR. HUYCK:

Q A related bidding entity is an individual corporation and so on. It has a shareholder and partner and principal, officer, general partner, or other person or entity having an ownership interest in common with a contractual relationship with any other registrant in the 2002 annual sale.

Did you feel that in any way you were a related bidding entity to BG?

A No, absolutely not. This definition alone proves that I had nothing to do with any other entity at that tax sale, ever.

It spells it out. I know I was not a shareholder in any other company that was in there. I was not a partner. I was not a principal. I was not an officer or a general partner. And I had no ownership interest in common with BG or

Atlantic or a contractual relationship with BG or Atlantic or any other registrant at the 2002 annual sale. I mean, that is as clear and cut and dry as words on a paper can be.

- Q Now, I believe you mentioned, and your dad, of course, also mentioned in his deposition, that he had been participating in these tax sales for many years, is that correct?
- A That is correct.

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- Q And Dan Elkin, who was doing the bidding for him, also was frequently at these sales, is that correct?
- 11 A Yes, he was doing the bidding for BG or Atlantic and, yes.
- 12 Q Now, were you aware of any attempt to hide the fact that 13 you were your dad's son?
- 14 A No, absolutely not. I did at least half to more than half 15 of the bidding. I was in the room.
- 16 Q And you got to know some of the other bidders that were 17 there in the room?
 - A Yes, I got to know, you know, on a -- I wouldn't call it, you know, a professional basis -- almost all the bidders in the room.
- 21 Q And they knew that you were David Gray's son?
- 22 A Yes, that's right.
- Q And were you aware that people knew that Dan Elkin was an employee of your dad?
 - A I would certainly think so. He had been working for my

Timothy Gray - redirect

1 Q Well, there is one year she didn't actually welcome your 2 business, right? 3 No, that's not true. Α 4 Was there a year after the implementation of the single 5 simultaneous bidder rule where you were ejected from the sale 6 for violating the single simultaneous bidder rule? 7 Α No. That's not the way I would say it. 8 Q That's not the way you would say it? 9 That's certainly not the way I would describe. 10 Was there ever a period of time after the implementation 11 of the single simultaneous bidder rule where you were not 12 allowed to bid at the tax sale because the treasurer's office 13 believed you had violated the rule? 14 Α That is a question --15 Q It's a yes or no question. 16 Α Well, I can't answer it yes or no. 17 Okay. So your testimony here is that there was never a 18 time that you were prevented from bidding at one of the tax 19 sales for violating the single simultaneous bidder rule? 20 There is no question about it. The treasurer never 21 thought I violated it. 22 There was a question as to the relatedness and my 23 being in the room. It was not a violation. 24 You were prevented from bidding because of the question as 25 to the relatedness, right, Mr. Gray?

Timothy Gray - redirect

	Timothy Gray - redirect
1	A That's not how I remember it, sir.
2	Q That's not how you remember it?
3	A Correct.
4	Q But you were prevented from bidding for a period of time
5	at one of the sales, is that correct, Mr. Gray?
6	A Sir, I believe
7	MR. HUYCK: Objection.
8	THE COURT: Excuse me?
9	MR. HUYCK: He keeps asking the same question.
10	THE COURT: It's because it hasn't been answered
11	directly. So the objection is overruled.
12	THE WITNESS: It was during a lunch break.
13	BY MR. STEIN:
14	Q Sir, it was a yes
15	THE COURT: Start the question over again. The
16	answer is stricken. It wasn't responsive. Ask the question
17	again.
18	BY MR. STEIN:
19	Q Was there ever a time that you were prevented from bidding
20	at a sale because of a question as to the relatedness?
21	A Yes.
22	MR. STEIN: Thank you.
23	THE COURT: Mr. Huyck.
24	RECROSS EXAMINATION
25	BY MR. HUYCK:

Q Will you tell us then about that incident?

A I would be happy to tell you, Tom.

Just before lunch on one of the days, there was a complaint that what came in from another tax buyer -- I don't know who it was -- but there was a complaint -- still to this day I don't know who it was and do not care -- where they complained that, as David Gray's son, or Timothy Gray, I was in that room bidding and I should not have been in that room bidding because there was another bidder.

It was right before lunch, as I remember it, and I was asked then to produce some type of documentation showing that, in fact, I was independent, if you will.

I had a third party attorney at the time, who then I called. He came over with me, and we spoke personally to Martha Mills, who was the tax sale supervisor at the time. And he did most of the talking, as he was my attorney at the time.

He showed some documents; namely, the documents that proved that I own a hundred percent of Wheeler-Dealer. He explained to her the situation, that we were not bidding on each other's behalf, that I was doing my entire own thing. I was young, building up my business.

She accepted that. She actually went away for a period of maybe three minutes. She came back. She handed the documents back to Mr. Brown. She said: I understand what

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you're saying. You can go back into the room now and bid.

That was in, I think, 2001 for the 1999 taxes, if I remember correctly. And since then, I have not had a single problem with the treasurer's office. So from my point of view, having a conversation with a third party attorney --

MR. STEIN: Your Honor, objection to the narrative answer.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. HUYCK:

- What was the name of the attorney that went with you?
- His name was Burt Brown. Α
- Now, the question that Mr. Stein asked you about, the representations and warranties again, about the meaning of that paragraph A in there, you're not a lawyer, are you,
- Mr. Gray?
- No, I'm not. Α
- And when you testified about what you meant about having common finances, were you testifying about what your understanding of the form was back then at the time you signed the form?
- Α Yes.
- And BG never loaned you any money to participate in this sale?
- Α Never.
- Did it ever loan you any money at all?

7	1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
A	2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
	3	
	4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY)
	5	COMPANY, et al., Docket No. 05 C 4095
	6	Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs,
	7	VS. Chicago Illinois
	8	JOHN BRIDGE, et al., October 17, 2011 9:50 a.m.
	9	Defendants.
	10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,
	11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367
	12	vs.
	13	AUGADTI 1000 00 Tue
Ð:	14	HEARIWOOD 88, INC., et al., Chicago, Illinois Defendants.
	15	
	16	VOLUME 5 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS REFORE THE HONORARI E MATTHEM E MENNICH IN AND A MATTHEMATTHEM.
	17	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY
	18	APPEARANCES:
	19	For the Disintiff. DEED ONTEL LLD
	20	For the Plaintiff: REED SMITH, LLP BY: MR. JOHN W. MOYNIHAN
		MR. JONATHAN S. QUINN MR. MAX A. STEIN
	21	MR. THOMAS M. LEVINSON 10 South Wacker Drive, 40th Floor
	22	Chicago, Illinois 60606
	23	
	24	
t.	25	

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A Yes.

- Q So the fact that it might sell one of those liens to another tax buyer doesn't change that fact, does it?
 - A That's correct.
 - Q Under your understanding of the rule, if a tax buyer registers for the sale in order to bid on liens for its own benefit, there's nothing wrong with that, is there?
- 8 A No.
 - Q I'd like to show what has been marked as Defense Exhibit 76.
 - Now, this first page is a letter dated August 22nd, 2005. And it's a letter that the treasurer's office sent to BCS on that date, isn't that correct?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q Okay. And this was a -- what the treasurer's office was
 16 doing here was enclosing a survey that they were asking BCS to
 17 fill out?
- 18 A That's correct.
- 19 Q The survey was asking them, for the tax buyer's impression of how the sale was run that year, isn't that correct?
- 21 A That's correct.
- 22 Q This was sent out after the sale?
- 23 A Yes.
- 24 Q Basically saying, how did it go?
- 25 | A Right.

Meyers - cross

	Meyers - cross
1	A Yes.
2	Q And in the area where you can write your own comments, you
3	said the liens between 60 and \$90,000 Sass was getting 90
4	percent of those even when there were several bidders at zero
5	percent, correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q You knew that before this lawsuit was filed that that was
8	how the auctioneers were awarding liens, didn't you?
9	A Yes.
10	MR. PEARL: I have nothing further, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Mr. Friedman.
12	MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning. My name is Arthur
13	Friedman on behalf of some but not all of the Gray defendants.
14	CROSS EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
16	Q I just have a couple of questions, Miss Meyers.
17	If I have a daughter, and I do have a daughter, and
18	she has an independent company and I have an independent
19	company, she owns her company, I own my company, both of us
20	registered and bid at the sale, that's not a violation of the
21	rules as you understand it, correct?
22	A Not that I'm aware of.
23	MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Anyone else on the defense side?
25	Redirect?

Stoller - direct

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Q Miss Stoller, I'm sorry to interrupt you. You heard also throughout this trial, you have heard defense counsel refer to you as rich. Have you been here for that?

- A Yes.
- Q And you've heard defense counsel say that you filed this lawsuit because you wanted to get richer?
- A I heard them say that.
- Q How would you characterize your own financial well-being?
- I am successful. I have worked very hard for everything. I'm totally self-made. My staff worked hard. We worked sometimes 24/7. Whatever I have it's because of what I earned.
- Q And why did you file this lawsuit on behalf of BCS Services?
- I was angry that these people -- I'm a survivor, and this whole lawsuit is about -- to me it's very simple. You're supposed to have one -- each company is to have one bidder. I only had one bidder. Mr. Marks only had one bidder. But there were lots of other bidders in the room. And as a result of all those other bidders we were not getting our fair share of the product. And that's why I filed it. I worked hard in this business.
- Miss Stoller, tell us about your upbringing.
- A I'm a South Side girl. My natural father died when I was five. My mother remarried. I'm from Brighton Park, which is

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Bridge - direct

	Bridge - direct
1	Q That's right. CMS did not have any of its own personnel,
2	right?
3	A That's correct.
4	Q And CMS offered the same services that SI Management
5	offered?
6	A Yes.
7	Q What is the cluster of tax buying entities that's next? I
8	don't know what color that is.
9	How would you describe that color?
10	A Green.
11	THE COURT: It's either yellow-green or green-yellow
12	or the color of your tie, whichever you prefer.
13	Those of us who had the Crayola 64 back in the day,
14	it's not clear whether that's yellow-green or green-yellow.
15	MR. JONATHAN QUINN: I didn't know whether maybe it
16	was puce.
17	THE WITNESS: That's green. On here it's green.
18	BY MR. JONATHAN QUINN:
19	Q I will go with green.
20	Who is listed in the green cluster?
21	A Interstate and a company called Central.
22	Q And those entities are grouped together because you
23	believe they were owned by two different members of the same
24	family, right?
'a II	A Yes

2681

	2681 II
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
2	EASTERN DIVISION
3	
4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY) COMPANY, et al.,
5) Docket No. 05 C 4095 Plaintiffs,)
6	vs.
7) Chicago, Illinois JOHN BRIDGE, et al.,) October 26, 2011
8	Defendants.
9	Defendantes.)
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,
11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367
12	vs.
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al., Chicago, Illinois
14	Defendants.
15	VOLUME 11
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY
17	ADDEADANCEO.
18	APPEARANCES:
19	For the Plaintiff: REED SMITH, LLP
20	BY: MR. JOHN W. MOYNIHAN MR. JONATHAN S. QUINN
21	MR. MAX A. STEIN MR. THOMAS M. LEVINSON
22	10 South Wacker Drive, 40th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606
23	
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Yes, I see. Α

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22 Α Okay.

> Okay. But just the phrase "finances in common," you don't know exactly what that means I guess is the point.

I could -- I could sit here and come up with 7500 Α

Okay. It says "it," referring to a bidding entity registering to be permitted to participate, "it has no capital, purchase money, or other finances in common with any other bidding entity or person registering to bid."

And would it be fair to say that you really don't have any idea what that means, the phrase "finances in common," what that means specifically?

- I know in general what it means. Α
- Well --Q
- What I meant to say in terms of not understanding high finance is that there are probably six million schemes for doing these kinds of things that would be difficult to uncover. We did the best we could with this kind of a thing. And, again, this is not the sale I was at, but I assume we had something similar.
- When you say it's not the sale you were at, this was the sale that took place in 2004. Now, maybe you weren't physically present at the sale, but --
- Α Okay. But this was the sale in 2004.
- Q Yes.

Mills - redirect

	Mills - redirect
1	explanations for what that might mean, but it would be
2	speculation. And we know what we were trying to get at. If
3	somebody came back and said yes, we have this, we have this,
4	we have this, we would have looked at it.
5	Q 0kay.
6	A But nobody ever came back and said any of these things
7	were true.
8	MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.
9	THE COURT: Who's next? Nobody else on the defense
10	side?
11	Redirect?
12	MR. JONATHAN QUINN: Yes, I do, your Honor.
13	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
14	BY MR. JONATHAN QUINN:
15	Q Ms. Mills, Mr. Pearl was asking you some questions about
16	whether a tax buyer at the annual tax sale would be guaranteed
17	to receive liens. Do you recall those questions?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And you testified that of course there was no such
20	guarantee, right?
21	A Yes.
22	Q But in the instance of liens that were that were sold
23	at zero percent
24	Let me step back.
25	Would you agree with me that in the years you were at

Mills - recross

	Mills - recross
1	THE COURT: Mr. Huyck, anything else?
2	MR. HUYCK: Nothing.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Friedman.
4	RECROSS EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. FRIEDMAN:
6	Q Getting back to some of the questions I was asking before,
7	I think we you've indicated that no one ever brought to
8	your attention, as far as you recall, you never got
9	First of all, no one was ever disqualified, to your
10	knowledge, from participating in the sale?
11	A Under that rule, no.
12	Q Under that rule, right.
13	And would you agree with me that the language of the
14	rule is subject to different interpretations by different
15	people? Would that be fair?
16	A That would be fair, but nobody ever said they did any of
17	those things, so nobody ever had a chance to look. That's the
18	problem.
19	© So that if in any hypothetical situation something might
20	have been deemed a concern to somebody, we don't know whether
21	that concern would have gone any further because it never
22	happened, correct?
23	A That's correct.
24	Q I'm assuming that if two tax buyers, two registered tax
25	buying entities both went to the LaSalle Bank and got separate

Mills - recross

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lines of credit, then that -- that certainly wouldn't be a violation of the rule as far as you understand?

Two totally separate people who went to the same bank for their own lines of credit, that's no problem, as far as I can see.

In a situation in which --0

Well, let me do it this way: Assume for a moment that two registered tax buyers both registered at the sale and each bid and each retained its own liens, in other words, each was bidding on its own behalf, wasn't bidding on behalf of anybody else, it was bidding on its own behalf, and one didn't assign the liens to another. That wouldn't strike you as a violation of the rule, would it?

- I can't speculate, and I'm not going to speculate.
- And, again, information that you would have received, if you had received any --

And apparently you did receive some complaints?

- We got complaints, but they were never backed up with any information that was usable.
- Whatever complaints you had you shared with the state's attorney?
- We did. Α
- And the state's attorney never advised you that there was something that could be acted upon?
- The state's attorney always told us there was not

1	IN THE UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT EASTERN DIV	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3		
4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY) COMPANY, et al.,	
5	Plaintiffs,	Docket No. 05 C 4095
6	vs.	
7	\	Chicago, Illinois
8	Defendants.	October 26, 2011 1:40 p.m.
9	Defendants.	
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,	
11	Plaintiffs,	Docket No. 07 C 1367
12	vs.	
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al.,	Chicago, Illinois
14	Defendants.	
15	VOLUME 1	• •
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PI BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW	
17	ADDEADANCES.	
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the Plaintiff: REED SMIT	
20	MR.	JOHN W. MOYNIHAN JONATHAN S. QUINN
21	MR.	MAX A. STEIN THOMAS M. LEVINSON
22	10 South Chicago,	Wacker Drive, 40th Floor Illinois 60606
23		
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1 Q. And did you do the same calculation for the other 2 defendant groups, the Gray and the Salta enterprises as well? 3 Α. I did. 4 And is that what's depicted on the slide in front of Q. 5 you? 6 Α. And what this slide depicts are the total -- the summary of the liens that were subject to reallocation to BCS 7 and Phoenix Bond from each of the three defendant 8 9 enterprises. 10 And what I want to point out for the jury is, 11 remember that Sabre started out with 25,000 liens; Grays with 9300 liens; and Salta with 7,000 liens. That was the 12 13 starting point. 14 And then I whittled it down to these numbers here. And these numbers are the liens subject to reallocation. 15 That doesn't mean that I reallocated all these liens. 16 17 Q. And what was the next step in determining the number of 18 liens to be reallocated to the plaintiffs? It was really to determine what I am calling the 19 plaintiffs' fair share of those liens. In other words, they 20 can't get all of them. That wouldn't be right. But they got 21 22 a portion of them based on my computation. 23 And how did you calculate the number of liens to be Q.

reallocated to the plaintiffs?

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A. I calculated what was called the win percentage for each

1 year. And I took that win percentage and I multiplied it by 2 the liens that were subject to reallocation for each year. 3 And what do you mean by "bid win percentage"? Q. 4 The bid win percentage is the percentage of liens that, Α. 5 in this case, that BCS won that they intended to bid on, that were on the bid sheets, which is why I said before that with 6 the video bid adjustment, if the liens that were on the bid 7 sheets were to go down -- take the 3981, if that goes down 8 because the video bid percentage goes up, then the bid win 9 percentage goes up, the way I am calculating it. And you 10 11 will see it in a second. 12 So let's walk through one year as an example. Q. 13 How did you calculate the calculation for the 2003 14 tax sale year? 15 Well, when I got done with the adjustments for the video bid adjustment and for the matching to the bid lists, this is 16 17 what I was left with. I was left with the liens won by all eligible bidders. And this carves out the defendants' 18 portion of the pie. That's not in these calculations yet 19 20 because what I am trying to do, I am trying to calculate, of the defendants' portion of the pie, how much of that pie 21 22 should BCS get? 23 So I excluded them in this part of the calculation. 24 So I said, all right, BCS won 566. All other

eligible bidders won 3,981. Therefore, the liens won by all

1 eligible bidders is 4.547. I then took the 566, divided it by the 4,547, and 2 said the bid win percentage for that year is 12.45 percent. 3 So what that is saying is that for every hundred 4 liens that BCS bid on, they would win approximately 12 of 5 6 them, 12 and a half of them. 7 And is Phoenix Bond included in the 3,981 you have here? Q. 8 Α. Yes. 9 Now, you have Peters listed here as well, right? Q. 10 Α. Yes. 11 Q. Why? 12 Well, because they are deemed to be ineligible. That's Α. 13 not to mean that I took the liens that Peters won and awarded 14 any to the plaintiffs. I didn't do that. I just said they 15 are not eligible. 16 As you can see, if you take the Sabre calculation, 17 multiply that by 12.45 percent -- if you could, step back a second -- you can see the liens that were to be reallocated, 18 464 from Sabre to BCS; from Grays to BCS is 161; from Salta 19 20 to BCS is 123. 21 Peters -- none of Peters' liens were reallocated to 22 the plaintiffs.

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1 prepared that? 2 No. Α 3 So you don't know who prepared that? 4 MR. JONATHAN QUINN: Your Honor, we covered --5 objection. Repetitive. 6 THE COURT: Sustained. Rule 403. You've covered 7 this point adequately. 8 BY MR. PEARL: Did you verify any of the information that you were sent? 9 10 No. But as I testified to earlier, how I got comfort 11 around it. 12 Mr. Shaffer, did you verify any of the information you 13 were sent on those Excel spreadsheets? 14 No. Α 15 And the bid lists that were used to create those and then the one bid list that was recreated because they didn't have 16 17 it, you never looked at those, did you? 18 When you say "those," what part are we talking about? Α 19 The bid lists, the bid lists. You never looked at --0 20 The Excel sheets that I received? Α 21 No, Mr. Shaffer. The bid lists that went into preparing 0 22 the spreadsheets? 23 I'm sorry. Because I'm calling them bid books, but Okay.

The bid books. You never looked at the bid books,

okay.

Sure.

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- A I saw an excerpt of one.
- You didn't look at the bid books --

An excerpt of one?

- A I saw an excerpt of a couple of pages from one, yeah.
- Q A couple of pages. Okay. So you didn't look at those hundreds or thousands of pages of bid lists to compare them to the spreadsheet to make sure the spreadsheet was accurate?
- A Absolutely not.

MR. JONATHAN QUINN: Objection, 403.

THE COURT: To that particular question I'm overruling the objection, but --

BY THE WITNESS:

A No, I did not.

BY MR. PEARL:

- $\ensuremath{\mathbb{Q}}$ Now, the original bid sheets, bid lists, bid sheets, the original bid sheets from which those Excel spreadsheets were prepared.
- A I'm with you.
- 20 Q Okay. Those themselves were not accurate with respect to 21 the liens the plaintiffs actually bid zero percent on; isn't 22 that right?
 - A In what way?
- 24 \Q Well, those bid sheets only showed what they intended to 25 | bid on; isn't that true?

- A That's correct.
- 2 | Q And about 120 hours in 2003?
- 3 A Correct.

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- 4 \ \Q 120 hours in '04, 90 hours in '05, 108 hours in '06, 90 hours in 2007 that weren't shown on the video?
- 6 A I'm assuming your hours are right, yes.
- 7 Q 648 hours of auction that were not shown on any videotape, 8 correct?
- 9 A Correct.
- 10 Q And the video is the only actual evidence, perhaps, of the actual bids the plaintiffs placed zero percent, 1 percent, any percentage; isn't that right?
- 13 A I'm only aware of that video, yes.
 - Somebody watched the video and tried to determine how many liens the plaintiffs actually bid on; isn't that right?
- 16 A Yes.

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- 17 | Q Who did that?
 - A Initially it was someone at Reed Smith, and then I had another person do it at my office.
 - © Somebody at Reed Smith, one of the attorneys over there?
 - A I don't know if it was an attorney or a paralegal. It's a young lady that I met.
 - Q Do you remember her name?
- 24 A No.
- 25 Now, someone in your office watched -- someone in your

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- ${ t A}$ And then I did my computations based on that.
- And if the Grays are eligible to bid, then my clients pay less, right?
- A If they're deemed to be eligible, then the damages would go down, yes.
- Q Okay. And if the Grays are ineligible to bid, then my clients will have to pay more under your analysis; isn't that right?
- A As compared to the Grays being deemed eligible, yes.
- ☐ That's correct, right.

I'd like to --

You started working on this case in August of 2008; isn't that true?

- A I think I was first contacted back in August of 2008, yes.
- Q And you said that some of the people you worked with were Mark Pearson?
- A Yes.
- 19 Q Uma?
- 20 A Uma D.
 - And if you can't pronounce it, I guarantee I can't pronounce it.

And was there -- and two others that I can't remember. Nicole maybe?

A Nicole is at FTI. Amy Lerek. There was a Scott Petrie

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS	
2	EASTERN DIVISION	
3		
4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY) COMPANY, et al.,	
5	Docket No. 05 C 4095	
6	vs.	
7	JOHN BRIDGE, et al., Chicago, Illinois	
8	l 9:35 a.m. ′	
9	Defendants.)	
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,	
11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367	
12	vs.	
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al., Chicago, Illinois	
14	Defendants.	
15	VOLUME 14	
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY	
17	400-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-40-	
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the Plaintiff: REED SMITH, LLP	
20	BY: MR. JOHN W. MOYNIHAN MR. JONATHAN S. QUINN	
21	MR. MAX A. STEIN MR. THOMAS M. LEVINSON	
22	10 South Wacker Drive, 40th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606	
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of the mail or a private or commercial interstate carrier.

And I will now define some of the terms used in this instruction.

A scheme to defraud is a plan or course of action formed with the intent to deceive or cheat a person or entity and to obtain money or property from a person or entity by using one or more material false pretenses, representations or promises.

A false or fraudulent pretense, representation or promise is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision of the person or entity to which it was addressed. A material false or fraudulent pretense, representation or promise may be accomplished by concealing material information.

A person acts knowingly if he realizes what he is doing and is aware of the nature of his conduct and does not act through ignorance, mistake or accident. In deciding whether a defendant acted knowingly, you may consider all of the evidence, including what the defendant did or said.

Knowledge of a fact may exist if a person believes there is a high probability that the fact exists and takes deliberate actions to avoid learning the fact. A person acts with the intent to defraud a person or entity if he acts with the intent to deceive or cheat that person or entity in order to bring about a financial gain to himself or a financial loss

 to the person or entity.

Good faith on the part of a defendant is inconsistent with intent to defraud. A defendant is not required to prove that it acted with good faith; rather, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to defraud.

To use or cause the use of the mail or a private or interstate carrier, a defendant need not actually intend that the use take place and need not have used the mail or private interstate carrier himself or itself.

The plaintiffs must prove, however, that the defendant knew the use would occur or that the defendant knew the use would occur in the ordinary course of business or that the defendant knew facts from which the use reasonably could have been foreseen.

The use of the mail or private interstate carrier must assist in carrying out the scheme to defraud or part of the scheme to defraud, but the item that was sent need not be fraudulent. It can be an innocent or routine mailing or one that was sent for a legitimate business purpose.

Each use of the mail or a private or interstate carrier in furtherance of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate act of mail fraud.

Plaintiffs' third claim is that the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs' prospective business advantage. To succeed on this claim against the particular

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defendant you're considering, the plaintiff you're considering must prove each of the following things by a preponderance of the evidence:

Number 1. The plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of entering into one or more valid business relationships with the Cook County treasurer's office by obtaining additional liens at the annual tax sale.

Number 2. The defendant was aware of the plaintiffs' expectation.

Number 3. The defendant intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with the plaintiffs' expectation, preventing it from ripening into a valid business relationship.

Number 4. The defendants' conduct caused injury to the plaintiff.

And I will define certain of these terms in the next instruction.

First, "intentional interference." A person or entity intentionally interferes with an expectation of a business relationship if he or it knows that interference with the relationship is substantially certain to occur as a result of his or its conduct even if that is not his primary purpose or desire.

Secondly, interference is unjustifiable, as that term is used in this case, if the defendant did not comply with the

. .

Cook County treasurer's rules and regulations governing the annual tax sale, despite representing that it would do so.

If you find in favor of one or both plaintiffs and against one or more defendants on one or more of the plaintiffs' claims, then you will be required to determine what amount of damages, if any, to award to the particular plaintiff on the particular claim against the particular defendant. If you find in favor of all the defendants on all of the plaintiffs' claims, then you will not consider the question of damages.

The plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages on claims 1, 2 and 3 and punitive damages on claim 3. This instruction concerns compensatory damages. If you find in favor of a plaintiff and against one or more defendants on any one of the plaintiffs' claims, then you must determine the amount of money that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for any injury that you find it sustained as a direct result of the wrongful conduct of the enterprise for claims 1 and 2 or of the defendant for claim 3. This is called compensatory damages.

The plaintiff must prove its damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Your award must be based on evidence and not speculation or guesswork. On the other hand, the law does not require a plaintiff to prove the amount of its damages with mathematical precision, but only with as much

assess punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff and against any defendants that you have found liable. The purpose of punitive damages are to punish a party for its wrongful conduct and to serve as an example or warning to that party and others not to engage in similar conduct in the future.

The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that punitive damages should be assessed against the particular defendant you are considering.

You may assess punitive damages against a defendant only if you find that the defendant's conduct was malicious or willful and wanton. A defendant's conduct was malicious if it was accompanied by ill will or spite or was done for the purpose of harming the plaintiff. A defendant's conduct was willful and wanton if it showed an utter disre -- excuse me -- if it showed an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the plaintiffs' rights.

If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, then you must use sound reason in setting the amount of those damages. Punitive damages, if any, should be in an amount sufficient to fulfill the purposes that I have described to you but should not reflect bias, prejudice or sympathy toward any party. In determining the amount of any punitive damages, you should consider the following factors:

The reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff, the

Jonathan Quinn - closing

bidding entity rule, but at least in this year's materials, the text of the rule itself was contained in the registration requirements. So this is the rule. And then there's a form that asks you to acknowledge under oath, under penalty of perjury, that you are in compliance with the rule.

And that acknowledgment form does, in fact, restate the rule. And, in fact, as you will see in a moment, it also contains a definition of relatedness that is not contained here. So, again, it is somewhat confusing to see exactly where all the rules are, but we submit to you that's beside the point.

If you look at -- if you look at all of it together, you look at the text of the regulations, you look at the acknowledgement form, you look at the representations and warranties, in sum total, it's crystal clear what it is that is being prohibited.

And, more importantly -- we'll get to this in a moment. More importantly than what the words say, and as you have seen from the evidence, what the evidence suggests, what the evidence compels, is that the lengths to which the defendants took to conceal their relatedness, the lengths to which the defendants took to conceal the manner in which they used common funding, common resources, common personnel, the extent to which they concealed all those things tells you everything you need to know about what the rule prohibits

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because, as if the language of the rule itself weren't clear enough, the lengths to which the defendants took to conceal their relatedness tells you that they knew full well what the rule prohibited because they were in violation of it and they were taking steps to conceal that.

So in number 3 of the regulations, it says that each tax buyer desiring to participate must sign an agreement to abide by the single simultaneous related bidding entity rule to make certain disclosures.

Now, this section has been read, and various parties have underlined certain sections, various parties have underlined other sections. Undoubtedly you will see defense counsel put different sections of it up with different sections underlined. I want to focus on a couple of words here that have been overlooked but that I submit to you are critically important.

No tax buyer may have its, his, her, their actual or apparent, actual or apparent, and then it goes on, agents, employees, related entities.

The key here is that the rules and regulations of the treasurer's office didn't simply prohibit actual relatedness. They prohibited anything that would make that relatedness even apparent. The point is that even the perception of impropriety was in and of itself a violation. And you will recall that in the registration materials -- and you can look

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at them yourselves -- the registration materials have in them sections which allow a prospective tax buyer to explain, to explain, circumstances under which perhaps it would be apparent that there was relatedness.

So, for example, if someone believed they were in compliance but understood that perhaps someone else may perceive that they were in violation, there was an opportunity to explain in the registration materials the circumstances under which there was apparent relatedness and submit that to the treasurer's office for their consideration. You will remember that not a single defendant put anything in that space in the registration materials, none. Their position was on the face of things, they were neither actual or apparent agents, employees or related entities. That is critical.

And Ms. Mills testified that what the rules and regulations were attempting to do was to encompass anything that even touched upon bidders participating in the same source of funding, same resources, same personnel. They were trying to cover everything that even could conceivably run the risk of an appearance of impropriety. So actual or apparent is very critical there.

Then it goes on in an obvious attempt to be as overinclusive as possible. Directly or indirectly register under multiple registrations. And here again, another important phrase that has been overlooked: For the intended

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alone worthy of no respect. The fact of the matter is I'm a father and the son of a father, and the desire of a father to provide for his family is an instinctual and largely natural instinct. It's an admirable one and one that we should applaud. However, there's a right way of doing things and there's a wrong way of doing things. And in the name of -- in the name of a parental desire to provide for family, as you yourselves know, people embark on numerous ill-conceived, misconceived and unlawful pursuits. And the most stark example we have in this case, the most stark example that the evidence has presented us, happens to be in the people, in the persons, of Stanford and Andrew Marks.

Here you have the audacious Marshall Atlas and David Gray telling you that the reason they established multiple bidders was because they wanted to provide for their families. Take a step back. You were told by numerous people in their opening statements that you should use your common sense. You were implored to use your common sense. You should use your common sense. I completely agree with that.

Why in the world would it be necessary for a father, in order to provide for his family, to set up another company in his own offices to compete against him for liens in the annual sales but for wanting to have another bidder in the room?

Stanford Marks doesn't want to provide for his

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family? Stanford Marks is not interested in his son Andrew's well-being? When Andrew Marks wanted to join his father in the tax buying business, he joined his father in the tax buying business. He joined him at Phoenix Bond. His father -- and Stanford and Andrew now work together in Phoenix Bond. Stanford Marks didn't set up another company. He didn't set up a dummy corporation with his wife and his other family members, the shareholders.

You will remember that Stanford Marks even testified that in the early part of this decade, when faced with their competitors who they were concerned did have multiple bidders, he and Andrew looked and they thought to themselves: Are we missing something? Is there something that we could be doing in order to get more bidders in the room? But they looked at the rules. It was crystal clear they couldn't have done that. For Stanford Marks to set up a corporation using some lawyer's Hebrew name and put Andrew Marks as the vice-president and put his wife as the president, it would run afoul of every rule the treasurer's office had.

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So the notion that Mr. Atlas and Mr. Gray and that SALTA and that Midwest entities, Wheeler-Dealer, BG, that somehow they get a pass because this was all motivated by fatherly concern, it's offensive. It's offensive.

The defendants are assuming that you can't use your common sense in judging whether that's an argument that makes sense to you. Why in the world is it necessary to set up another company to do that? It's nonsensical. There's only one reason to set up another company. And that's to violate the rules of the Cook County treasurer's office in order to get multiple bidders.

And, remember, these really were competitors. If you owned a tailor shop, you wanted to bring your family into the tailoring business, you're going to open a tailor shop across the street for your son? Of course not. It's absurd. Why would you start your family off as a competitor? The answer is that given the way the tax sales worked, given the way the Cook County annual tax sale worked, by setting up another company with your children bidding against you perhaps, you would get slightly fewer liens because it was a zero sum game. Any lien that was obtained by someone else you couldn't obtain. So maybe you'd get slightly more. But the calculation, a calculation that came true, was that the total number of liens obtained by both entities would be greater than the number of liens obtained by the single entity the

1 2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION	
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4	PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY) COMPANY, et al.,	
5	Docket No. 05 C 4095	
6	Plaintiffs,	
7	vs.) Chicago, Illinois	
8	JOHN BRIDGE, et al.,) November 4, 2011) 9:15 a.m.	
9	Defendants.)	
10	BCS SERVICES, INC., et al.,	
11	Plaintiffs, Docket No. 07 C 1367	
12	vs.	
13	HEARTWOOD 88, INC., et al., Chicago, Illinois	
14	Defendants.	
15	VOLUME 15	
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY AND A JURY	
17	ADDEADANCES.	
18	APPEARANCES:	
19	For the Plaintiff: REED SMITH, LLP	
20	BY: MR. JOHN W. MOYNIHAN MR. JONATHAN S. QUINN	
21	MR. MAX A. STEIN MR. THOMAS M. LEVINSON	
22	10 South Wacker Drive, 40th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606	
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Friedman - closing

part of the packages in the subsequent years. The representations and warranties section does not change the definition of the single simultaneous bidder rule or the definition of related bidding entities.

The representations and warranties provisions were or at least may have been added in 2004 because of a desire to get more information about possible connections between the registrants for purposes of enforcing the rule but not changing the rule. Any inference that plaintiffs might wish to draw from the fact that the Gray defendant registrants signed the representations and warranties section without noting that David Gray, Sr. had made a guarantee simply does not amount to evidence that any of the Gray defendants violated the rule or would have been an eligible bid.

As you know, a guarantee is simply a promise that says if the entity who was borrowing the money doesn't pay, then I will pay. There is no evidence whatsoever, nor could any evidence have been presented, that Wheeler-Dealer didn't pay for all of the money that it borrowed to participate in all of these sales pursuant to its line of credit.

Once again, the alleged scheme to defraud in this case is the placing of multiple bidders in the tax auction in order to obtain additional liens for a common principle, not merely a possible misstatement on a form. And as far as I'm concerned, and I will get to this in a moment, there was no

Friedman - closing

misstatement made in any of these applications.

First of all, there are only two of the representations and warranties that could even conceivably be relevant here. One of them is the representation that the registrant, the party registering, does not have finances in common, close quote.

And the second one is that the registrant does not have a, quote, common source of funds, close quote.

I submit to you that the fact that David Gray, Sr. guaranteed Wheeler-Dealer's line of credit, agreed to pay if Wheeler-Dealer didn't, does not qualify as finances in common, common source of funds. In fact, Martha Mills said that she doesn't even really know exactly what those terms mean. The finances used by Wheeler-Dealer came from LaSalle Bank. They didn't come from David Gray, and as I said a moment ago, no evidence that the bank ever called upon Mr. Gray to pay any indebtedness.

And I heard Mr. Quinn say a couple of times yesterday -- he used the phrase "crystal clear" in describing the rules and regulations, the representations and warranties. I also heard him say that -- I think this is in quotes.

In all candor, he said, the requirements of the registration packets are confusing as to what is meant by the single simultaneous bidder rule.

Most importantly here, failing to interpret the

Friedman - closing

representation about no finances in common, no common source of funds, as plaintiffs now attempt to do, certainly is no evidence of a scheme to defraud. If Martha Mills wasn't sure what those words mean, it seems hard to believe that there could be any kind of intent to defraud, a scheme to defraud, when those representations were given.

Similarly, the plaintiffs talk about the loan from Atlantic Municipal to Wheeler-Dealer. There was a loan. We'll talk about that in a minute. But it is not evidence that -- it is not evidence of anything that would support a finding of a violation of the rule, let alone mail fraud. As I said before, each registered bidder bid on its own behalf. The loan that was that --

There was a loan that had nothing to do with the tax sale, incidentally, but there was a loan that Atlantic made to Wheeler-Dealer. That loan was paid off in 2005. Atlantic Municipal did not bid until 2006. Tim Gray had no interest in Atlantic Municipal at the time that Atlantic Municipal was bidding. This is part, again, of what I view as an approach that kind of tries to throw whatever plaintiffs can throw up against a wall including misleading statements and implications in slides and argument.

So let me ask Gabe to put on the screen -- yes, here it is.

This is a slide that the plaintiffs put up in their

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closing argument. Okay, let's take a look at it here.

Well, what does it say about Atlantic Municipal corporation? It says that Atlantic Municipal Corporation was bidding at the 2005 to 2007 sales. That is false. It's undisputed that they did not bid in 2005. They bid in 2006 and 2007. That's a misrepresentation. This representation is misleading. I'm not certain of the right adjectives, but let's go to another one.

How do they describe Atlantic Municipal? Well, they say that the owners -- they imply that the owners are David, Jr., David Gray, Jr., Rickie Gray, Tim and Lori Gray. Now, they put a little footnote there, a little asterisk, and they say, well, Tim Gray was an owner before 2004. That's true. There is no reason for them to put Tim in that portion of the slide, period. He sold his shares in Atlantic Municipal. The documents are in the record in 2004. There is no question about that.

So when we got to -- so that in 2006 and 2007, the only years in which Atlantic Municipal bid, Tim Gray had no interest in it. There were no loans outstanding because that's -- there were no loans outstanding anymore between them.

Let's get to another misleading aspect of this presentation. Atlantic Municipal, they say, and there is this dollar sign with a red arrow, implying somehow that moneys are

Friedman - closing

going from Atlantic Municipal to Wheeler-Dealer. Well, as I said a moment ago, the loans that were made by Atlantic to Wheeler-Dealer had been paid off before Atlantic Municipal bid. But the plaintiffs I think want to try to suggest every way -- and these really are not -- with all due respect, they're not honest presentations of the facts.

And, finally, I guess I should have mentioned again, here again they try to tie David Gray, saying that he guaranteed a line of credit. He did guarantee the line of credit. He wasn't called upon to pay it. He didn't provide any financing that was used in the sale.

Okay, let me show you one other slide, if I may, Gabe. Okay, this is another one that the plaintiffs showed you. This is a portion of the combined financial statements and supplemental information for what is called here Midwest entities. And this is -- this is June 30th of 2000 and 1999, the two years -- it goes through June. Of course, that is three years before the first sale that is in issue in this case. And what that document says is that at that point Wheeler-Dealer was considered to be part of what the accountant described as the Midwest entities.

There is no entity known as Midwest entities. It doesn't exist. It is a term used by the accountant to describe entities that for bank financing purposes were being put together. At that point, in June 30th, 2000, yes,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an attorney, hereby certifies that on December 30, 2011, he served copies of the foregoing TRIAL TRANSCRIPT PAGES TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN BG DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POST-TRIAL MOTION (DKT. 911) on the parties of record pursuant to ECF as to Filing Users.

/s/ Arthur W. Friedman
Arthur W. Friedman